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Abstract—On-line applications and services are now a crit-
ical part of our everyday life. Using these services typically
requires us to trust our personal or company’s information to
a large number of third-party entities. These entities enforce
several security measures to avoid unauthorized accesses
but data is still stored on common database systems that
are designed without data privacy concerns in mind. As a
result, data is vulnerable against anyone with direct access
to the database, which may be external attackers, malicious
insiders, spies or even subpoenas.
Building strong data privacy mechanisms on top of com-
mon database systems is possible but has a significant impact
on the system’s resources, computational capabilities and
performance. Notably, the amount of useful computation that
may be done over strongly encrypted data is close to none,
which defeats the purpose of offloading computation to third-
party services.
In this paper, we propose to shift the need to trust in the
honesty and security of service providers to simply trust that
they will not collude. This is reasonable as cloud providers,
being competitors, do not share data among themselves.
We focus on NoSQL databases and present SafeRegions, a
novel prototype of a distributed and secure NoSQL database
that is built on top of HBase and that guarantees strong
data privacy while still providing most of HBase’s query
capabilities. SafeRegions relies on secret sharing and multi-
party computation techniques to provide a NoSQL database
built on top of multiple, non-colluding service providers
that appear as a single one to the user. Strikingly, service
providers, individually, cannot disclose any of the user’s data
but, together, are able to offer data storage and processing
capabilities. Additionally, we evaluate SafeRegions exposing
performance trade-offs imposed by security mechanisms and
provide useful insights for future research on performance
optimization.
Keywords-HBase, Secure databases, Multi party computa-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Convenience and significant economical savings are
spurring many enterprises and end users to move their
data and applications to third-party cloud services. This
naturally implies trusting that these services employ the
necessary mechanisms to ensure that their data is kept
private. However, such trust is misplaced. In fact, recent
studies have shown that a large amount of the data stored
in third-party infrastructures is unprotected against the pry-
ing eye of a system administrator, a government subpoena
or even an external attacker [1]. Notably, leveraging cloud
database storage and computational capabilities while en-
suring data privacy is still an open research challenge.
An immediate approach to achieve stronger data pri-
vacy guarantees is to strongly encrypt the data before
uploading it to third party infrastructures. However, this
solution raises several issues. For instance, if a traditional
symmetric cypher is applied to every database entry many
of the query capabilities of that database become unusable
since data properties, such as order, are lost with the
encryption scheme. As a result, the database becomes
nothing more than a storage service and computation over
the data must be made at the user side where data can
be decrypted and processed. Needless to say that this
defeats the purpose of using the storage and processing
capabilities of a third-party infrastructure. This limitation
can be partially solved by privacy-aware databases such as
CryptDB that leverages multiple encryption schemes and
rewrites database queries at the client side so that useful
computation can be done over protected data [2]. However,
this approach has been shown to still leak a significant
amount of sensitive information [3].
This paper explores an alternative solution for provid-
ing a privacy-aware database. The core idea behind this
solution is to divide data management and processing
amongst multiple service providers with independent in-
frastructures. By doing so, no provider is able to access
the original data or extract any kind of useful knowledge
from the protected data, while the client still has a fully-
functional NoSQL databases. Rooted on this idea, we
propose a solution that relies on secret sharing to divide
sensitive data into a set of secrets that are stored across
several domains that are not expected to collude. Each
secret reveals nothing about the data and can be seen
as a piece of a puzzle. With a single piece the puzzle
cannot be solved but, after every single piece is put into
the right place the puzzle is complete and the original data
is recovered. Additionally, the proposed solution relies on
secure multi-party protocols (MPC) to leverage distributed
computation on top of the secrets without leaking any
information. To sum up, by combining secret sharing and
multi-party protocols our proposal achieves both private
data storage and private processing.
The main contribution of the paper is SafeRegions, a
system built on top of the HBase NoSQL database that
resorts to secret sharing and MPC. SafeRegions leverages
the concept of a virtual cloud database composed by
multiple independent untrusted cloud infrastructures, a
concept that was previously discussed for secure storage
systems [4, 5]. In more detail, our prototype resorts to
different HBase clusters deployed on independent infras-
tructures and on a proxy that abstracts clients from this
distributed setup, thus presenting SafeRegions to clients’
applications as a regular HBase-like NoSQL database.
The paper is structured as follows: an introduction to se-
cret sharing, multi-party protocols and HBase is presented
in Section II. Section III presents SafeRegions’ architec-
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ture and discusses its components. Section V presents the
results and an analysis of SafeRegions prototype’s evalua-
tion. Section VI discusses related work while Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. BUILDING BLOCKS
SafeRegions combines secret sharing and MPC pro-
tocols with HBase to provide a privacy-aware NoSQL
database solution. Next we discuss each of these building
blocks in more detail.
A. Secret Sharing and MPC
Secret sharing schemes consider two types of entities,
a dealer D and a set of players P = {p1, . . . , pn}.
The purpose of a dealer is to transform a value v in
a set of n secrets and store on each player a single
secret. Each secret by itself does not leak any information
about v which conforms to our privacy needs. Value v
can be reconstructed only when all secrets are grouped
together [6].
The purpose of secret sharing is to ensure the privacy
of stored data. This way, this technique is not intended
to provide processing capabilities over the secrets. Secure
multi-party protocols solve this limitation by calculating
an arbitrary function over a set of private inputs, such
as the generated secrets, without leaking any sensitive
information. While many protocols have been proposed,
there are few practical implementations, which has lead
us to focus on the Sharemind protocols [7].
In Sharemind, values are protected with additive secret
sharing over a finite field Z2n . Additive secret sharing
enables arithmetic calculations to be performed over the
finite field which is crucial to compare values through
secure protocols. Namely, two protocols are proposed,
an Equality protocol and a GreaterThan protocol. The
protocols are bound to three parties. With a lower number
of parties, privacy cannot be ensured while an higher
number would only increase the overhead of computation.
The Sharemind protocols follow the following scheme.
There is one Dealer that, for each input value, generates
three secrets (1 in Figure 1). Each secret is stored in one
of three players (2 in Figure 2). To give an overview of a
protocol execution (depicted in Figure 2), let us consider
that the Dealer wants to search for a certain value v is
stored in the system. In order to do so, the Dealer generates
new secrets from v and sends one of them to each player
requesting a comparison protocol execution (1 and 2 in
Figure 2). Each player, in order to execute the protocol,
follows a set of secret generation and secret exchanging
steps with other players (3 in Figure 2). These computation
and message exchanging steps can be repeated. Next, each
player returns its computation result to the Dealer (4 in
Figure 2). Finally, the Dealer can extract the computation
result from the combination of the three secrets (5 in
Figure 2). In this case the result is one if the value v
was found in the system and zero otherwise.
Trust Model. The previous protocols are proven to be
secure under the passive (honest-but-curious) model. This
Figure 1. Store operation.
Figure 2. Search operation.
model assumes an attacker capable of gaining access to
the infrastructure of at most a single party, before the
execution of any protocol. The attacker can see all the
secrets held by the party, as well as all the messages
exchanged by such party. However, the attacker is not
capable of interfering in any way on the output of the
computation nor see any of the messages exchanged
between other entities [7]. Furthermore the protocols are
proven to be universally composable, meaning that every
protocol on the framework can be composed and remain
secure.
B. HBase
HBase is an open-source, widely used NoSQL data store
that offers high efficiency and scalability [8]. This data
store is heavily inspired by Google BigTable [9] and offers
a powerful and scalable data model. Similarly to relational
databases, information is stored on tables. However an
HBase table, contains two levels of columns: column fam-
ilies and column qualifiers. Column families are defined
on table declaration and group multiple column qualifiers.
As such the column qualifiers are always associated to a
column family and are only defined on value insertion.
In the case a column family does not contain a column
qualifier, the new qualifier is dynamical added. Each row
on a table has an unique identifier and the cells of the
table can contain empty values. Table I contains a model
of an HBase table with one column family, Name, and
two column qualifiers (First and Last Name).
As tables grow in size, HBase can scale dynamically by
partitioning a table horizontally, creating multiple regions.
Each region of a table holds a subset of the rows and is
stored on a single RegionServer. These servers do most of
the computation in HBase and are the backbone of HBase
scalability. The reminder of the computation is performed
by the HBase master. This entity manages the cluster in
a master/slave architecture and is the entry point of the
system. Every client operation must first interact with the
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Master that redirects the clients to a RegionServer that can
handle the request.
The HBase client API is composed by PUT, GET,
DELETE and SCAN operations. The PUT and DELETE
are the main operators used to insert, update or delete
a record. A simple PUT operation requires declaring a
row identifier, a column family and a column qualifier
to be inserted/updated. On the other hand, a DELETE
only requires specifying a row id in order to remove the
corresponding row. By default the GET operator returns
every column value from a single row of a table. However,
all these operations can be enhanced to only specify
certain column families or/and column qualifiers to be
inserted, deleted or retrieved. Finally the SCAN operator
returns the set of rows whose id is between a minimum
and maximum value. Similarly, a SCAN can return all
rows and corresponding columns or a filter may be used
to discard unwanted records. For instance it is possible to
define a SCAN operation that only returns the rows from
Table I where the value of column First Name is “John”.
The implementation/behavior of the previous operations
can be modified/extended without breaking the API or
changing the database source code due to the concept
of Coprocessors. Coprocessors enable developers to load
custom code for each operation that is executed by the
database. While there are several types of Coprocessors,
this paper focuses on the Endpoint Coprocessors. These
coprocessors allow adding new operations that can be used
by an HBase client application as a regular operation and
are essential to provide the MPC protocols on SafeRegions
in a generic and transparent manner.
The vanilla HBase system does not provide any mecha-
nisms to protect stored data’s privacy. In the next sections
we present SafeRegions, a novel solution to ensure private
storage and computation on top of HBase.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
The main idea of SafeRegions is to use additive secret
sharing to encrypt users’ data and then to leverage the
Equality and GreaterThan MPC protocols to provide se-
cure HBase operations. These two protocols are essential
since most computation done in HBase requires equality or
order comparison of values. However, there are two major
challenges that must be addressed to achieve a privacy-
aware HBase MPC solution. Firstly, the previous protocols
require three independent computation parties, which in
our case are three HBase clusters. Secondly, we want
to still offer a unified interface to clients, which implies
enhancing HBase client to abstract this distributed deploy-
ment and the novel security mechanisms while providing
the same API as the vanilla HBase client. In Figure 3
we present an high level overview of the SafeRegions
architecture. Along this section we briefly describe its
three main components: client, computation parties and
communication middleware.
Figure 3. SafeRegions Architecture
A. SafeRegions Client
The client component is the entry point to the SafeR-
egions system and provides the same API as the vanilla
HBase client. This component abstracts all the complexity
of protecting users’ data (secrets generation and decoding)
and the communication with the three HBase clusters.
The client is also responsible for orchestrating the in-
teraction with the different computation parties to process
user’s requests. It is the client component that transforms
user’s data into protected data to be stored and queried in
the same way as the Dealer in Figure 2.
In order to query protected data, the client queries each
one of the HBase clusters that then perform the necessary
MPC protocols on the locally stored secrets. In more
detail, this request can be made by issuing parallel remote-
procedure calls (RPC) calls to each HBase SearchEnpoint
coprocessor. Each HBase cluster processes the request
resorting to its local storage, and returns as a response a
vector with the resulting secrets of performing the desired
MPC protocolos. With the three vectors, the client can
merge the correct secrets and rebuild the information
contained in the query response. Lets take as example a
GET operation over protected row identifiers. The secure
client must encode, with secret sharing, the identifier
value being requested by the user and issue requests to
the HBase clusters using these secret shared identifiers.
Resorting to the Search operator, each cluster checks for
a corresponding row in their local storage. If found, the
cluster will reply to the client component with the corre-
sponding row. Finally, the client component is responsible
for decoding the answers and replying back to the user
with the actual queried data.
B. Computational Parties
In order to support the MPC protocols discussed in
Section II-A, we consider three computational parties in
our architecture that correspond to the players in Figure
2. In SafeRegions these components are three HBase
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clusters. Each cluster is responsible for one of the three
secrets generated per data piece. Naturally, this implies
that these clusters are structurally similar. They share the
same table structure and will hold the same amount of
data.
However, the clusters are necessarily deployed in inde-
pendent infrastructures and can be uniquely identified by
a number ID. This identification is important for the client
to store and collect secrets from the distinct clusters. For
instance, some data A is transformed into three secrets A1,
A2 and A3 to be stored in cluster 1, 2 and 3. Similarly, if
A1 is stored in TableOne at cluster 1, then A2 is stored
in an identical table at cluster 2 and so forth.
In addition to maintaining an identical structure across
HBase clusters, MPC protocols requires communication
between the clusters. This is achieved with a coprocessor
endpoint, which we call SearchEndpoint. The SearchEnd-
point does not require any modification to the architecture
neither to the implementation of the HBase core mech-
anisms. Nevertheless, the SearchEndpoint plays a central
role in the architecture. Each RegionServer must contain
this endpoint in order to expose the secure MPC protocols
as a RPC to be used by the client. Additionally, the
SearchEndpoint relies on a communication middleware for
exchanging secrets across parties (clusters), that is further
described next.
Upon the reception of a query request, the endpoint
starts a MPC protocol for every record stored in that
region server. The actual implementation of the protocol
is contained in a MPC library that performs all the nec-
essary computation (secret generation) and uses uses the
communication middleware to exchange messages across
parties (clusters). The validity of secrets computed with
the MPC library is verified at the endpoint that is also
responsible for replying back to the client with the query
response.
C. Communication Middleware
By default HBase does not support communication
across RegionServers. However, SafeRegions requires
communication across distinct HBase clusters. To achieve
this, we introduce a communication middleware between
the RegionServers to handle the exchange of messages
across parties. In order to support MPC protocols, the
communication middleware offers two essential primi-
tives. A send(secret, party) primitive that delivers a
secret to a target party in a non-blocking fashion and a
receive(party) primitive that waits for incoming mes-
sages. Moreover, the communication middleware ensures
that the messages sent from one party to another arrive in
order and that it is possible to always know the source
party that sent the message. These two properties are
needed for correctly supporting MPC protocols.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The system architecture proposed in the previous sec-
tion leaves open implementation decisions that impact the
inner working of the SafeRegions system. Starting with
maintaining different HBase structurally similar, there is
an immediate implementation detail that must be ad-
dressed, which is using secrets as row identifiers. In detail,
if secrets are used to protect HBase row identifiers, then
these cannot be mapped directly to the protected HBase
schema as identifiers because secrets generated by the
MPC library do not have deterministic content (due to
MPC randomness). This means that it becomes impossible
to match identical rows in different HBase clusters and to
update, retrieve or delete a specific row in SafeRegions.
To solve both problems, an extra column is added to the
HBase table for storing the protected identifiers (secrets).
Then, the row identifiers of each HBase table are replaced
with virtual identifiers managed by the SafeRegions client.
These identify uniquely each row and are identical across
different clusters. This virtual identifier does not leak any
sensitive information and allows matching rows and the
corresponding secrets across different HBase clusters.
For each MPC protocol execution request, our current
coprocessor implementation performs a simple sequential
iteration over every record stored in the corresponding Re-
gionServer and uses our implementation of the Sharemind
protocols to execute the necessary computation. When this
computation is finished, two of the RegionServers send
the generated secrets to a third RegionServer. This third
RegionServer combines the resulting secrets from every
record and discovers what are the HBase records that
match the NoSQL query being executed. This informa-
tion is then sent to the SafeRegions client that retrieves
from each HBase cluster the needed records (protected as
secrets) and combines them to decode the original values.
This last step does not compromise the privacy of stored
values and is an optimization of the standard Sharemind
protocol in order to lower the computation and number of
messages/data received at the SafeRegions client.
Finally, Sharemind protocols were implemented in Java
since there is not a freely available implementation. The
communication middleware is implemented using Java
NIO.
V. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of adding privacy
to common HBase operations such as, creating a table,
inserting records, and retrieving records, we performed a
set of experiments. The experiments ran on a cluster of
servers equipped with an Intel i3 CPU with four cores at
3.7 GHz, 8 GB of RAM and a 128GB SSD. Each machine
ran Ubuntu 14.04 and the SafeRegion Cluster was built
using HBase 0.98 in standalone mode. The results obtained
consist of one run of half an hour.
Finally, in the experiments we chose to preserve the
privacy of HBase identifiers with secret sharing. This
decision was taken because the tested operations perform
computation over the identifiers and not across the column
values. This way, to understand the overhead of our
solution identifiers must be protected while values can be
left in clear text.















Figure 4. Latency of table creation
















Figure 5. PUT Latency
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Figure 6. GET latency
table on vanilla HBase and on the SafeRegions system.
SafeRegions system introduces an overhead of 4.9% in
comparison to the vanilla HBase as depicted in Figure 4.
As expected, this overhead steams from adding a column
family in the table create statement and from issuing three
concurrent requests to each HBase cluster.
We then proceeded to evaluate the overhead of PUT
operations on both systems. In these experiments the client
is only inserting new keys. Since updates are not being
executed, no MPC protocol has to be performed. This
way, we are evaluating the overhead of creating three
secrets, and issuing three parallel PUT operations, one for
each cluster. The evaluation benchmark simulated multiple
clients by resorting to independent threads.
As can be seen in Figure 5 with a single client, the
latency overhead of PUT operations is 7%, however as
the number of clients increases the latency overhead also
increases, being the highest overhead value approximately
220%. This significant increase on latency comes from
spawning one thread per simulated client, each issuing
three additional concurrent PUT requests (1 per cluster).
In fact when there are n clients, there are n ∗ 3 PUT
operations to be made and n ∗ 3 threads. For instance,
when there are 20 clients, our benchmark has 60 PUT
operations and threads being executed concurrently. On
the other hand, the generation of random numbers by the
clients has small impact in performance. In detail, we use
the Uncommons maths library [10] that takes on average
0.016 ms to generate a random number.
Finally, we have evaluated the overhead incurred by
executing a MPC equal protocol. To evaluate this cost,
we ran a benchmark that pre-populated multiple rows on
the system and then performed several GET operations.
Each GET requires the equal protocol to be performed,
as described in section IV, in order to retrieve the correct
row identifier. From Figure 6, with a logarithmic scale, it is
possible to verify that the MPC equal protocol incurs a sig-
nificant overhead, while the default HBase can perform an
operation with a latency of milliseconds, the SafeRegions
operation is in the orders of seconds. While the latency
of the vanilla HBase has a constant 2 ms latency with the
increase of rows, the SafeRegion solutions sees an increase
on latency. For two hundred keys the latency reaches the
78 seconds on average. This significant increase is due
to the equal protocol that exchanges multiple messages
between the parties, for instance, with 8 byte keys it
requires 458 messages per comparison. Furthermore the
MPC protocols requires a comparison with every record
on the table, which is also a costly operation.
VI. RELATED WORK
Bringing privacy guarantees to the database-as-a-service
model (DBaaS) is a field still in expansion with multiple
paths being pursued. In 2002, NetDB2’s challenged the
database community to explore several open challenges
in databases [11]. One of the issues discussed was data
privacy, which was tackled with symmetric or asymmetric
encryption at the client side to protect users’ data before
being stored in a remote database.
The previous proposal requires queries computation to
be placed on the client side, which defeats the purpose of
leveraging the cloud’s computational resources. In order to
shift some of the computation away from the client, mul-
tiple systems proposed to use a trusted third-party service
to handle the communication and computation between
the client and the database service provider [12, 13, 14].
These solutions still depend on trusting a third-party entity.
In CryptDB a proxy mediates the communication be-
tween the client and database while rewriting queries to
leverage computation over protected data [2]. Data can
be encrypted with different schemes, deterministic encryp-
tion, order preserving encryption or Homomorphic encryp-
tion, with each one enabling different types of queries and
having different types of security guarantees. In the case of
deterministic encryption it has been shown that cryptDB
is susceptible to frequency analysis attacks [3]. Monomi
builds on top of cryptDB and improves the performance
of query processing by choosing in anticipation the most
appropriate encryption scheme for each database column.
Also query plans are used to decide which parts of the
query are processed in the untrusted service and which
are executed on the proxy/client [15].
Wai et al. takes a different approach to existing sys-
tems by removing the proxy and sharing the computation
between the client and the server [16]. Not only is the
architecture different but also the encryption schemes.
This system is based on secure MPC while sensitive
data is encrypted using secret sharing which encodes the
information in two secrets. One secret is stored on the
client while the other is stored at the server. With secret
sharing and secure MPC SQL operators can be pipelined
in a query, unlike in CryptDB where the operators that
can be executed are bound by the encryption scheme.
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The existing solutions focus mostly on SQL databases
and are not concerned with distributed databases that may
provide better performance and scalability. Our approach
is similar to Wai et al. since it also applies MPC protocols.
However, all queries are processed in the untrusted servers,
thus requiring minimal computation at the client side.
Furthermore we do not rely on the client to store meta-data
or secrets i.e., all data is stored on the HBase clusters.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces SafeRegions, a novel system that
combines secret sharing and MPC to provide privacy-
aware data storage and computation in NoSQL. Our proto-
type resorts to the widely used HBase NoSQL data store
and shows that it is possible to provide the full HBase
API for clients while ensuring that their data is stored in
a completely private fashion. In fact, by spreading the data
(secrets) into multiple HBase clusters, even if one of these
clusters becomes compromised, there is not any leakage
of sensitive information.
Like any other security mechanism, secret sharing and
MPC introduce a performance penalty in SafeRegions.
This is a necessary tradeoff, that is discussed in our
experimental evaluation section, in order to have stronger
security guarantees.
As future work, many design and implementation im-
provements are still possible. For instance, the secrets
can be calculated in parallel and the implementation of
the MPC protocols can be improved with batching or
additional parallelization.
To conclude, privacy in NoSQL comes always asso-
ciated with a performance/functionality cost. However,
we predict that in the near future, novel solutions and
optimizations will be proposed to tackle the information
privacy challenge that is now a global concern.
VIII. ACKNOWLEDEGEMENTS
The research leading to these results has received
funding from different sources. Rogério Pontes is fi-
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